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Abstract
In many situations in macroeconomics strategic complementarities arise,
and agents face a coordination problem. An important issue, from both a
theoretical and a policy perspective, is equilibrium uniqueness. We con-
tribute to this literature by focusing on the macroeconomic aspect of the
problem: the number of potential innovators, speculators e.t.c. is large.
In particular, we follow Myerson (1998, 2000) that in large games “a more
realistic model should admit some uncertainty about the number of play-
ers in the game”. In more detail, we model the coordination problem
as a Poisson game, and investigate the conditions under which unique
equilibrium selection is obtained.
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11 Introduction
In many situations in macroeconomics strategic complementarities arise: indi-
vidual payo s from taking a certain action are non-decreasing in the number of
agents who adopt the same strategy. Examples include technological spillovers
and innovation, currency crises, and others. Cooper (1999) is an excellent recent
treatment of complementarities in macroeconomic environments.0
In these environments, agents are called to coordinate their actions, and
a very important issue, from both a theoretical and a policy perspective, is
whether beliefs are indeterminate and non-cooperative equilibrium in pure strate-
gies is unique. The global games literature emphasise asymmetric information,
that arises by means of idiosyncratic noisy signals about economic fundamentals,
to obtain a unique equilibrium.1 Morris and Shin (2001) provide an overview
of this strand of research. Herrendorf et. al (2000), Burdzy et. al. (2001) and
Frankel and Pauzner (2000) exploit heterogeneity of agents to the same e ect.2
Also, Lee and Mason (2002), study the interaction of heterogeneity, uncertainty
about economic fundamentals and degree of complementarities.3
0I am indebted to G. Bulkley, E. Cannon, D. Demery, N. Duck, K. J. Van Garderen,
I. Jewitt, C. Leaver, H. Polemarchakis and seminar participants at Bristol and Exeter for
comments and lengthy discussions on earlier work this paper draws heavily upon. This paper
also draws heavily on research under Þnancial support from the European Commission under
contract ERBFMBICT950108, which is acknowledged with thanks. The usual disclaimer
applies.
1In this approach, agents’ private types are correlated. This approach, by utilising insights
in Schelling (1980), shows how introducing a small number of dominant strategy types into a
coordination game can select a unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium. See also Carlsson and van
Damme (1993).
2A related work is the investigation in Baliga and Sjostrom (2004) of the implications for
equilibrium selection, in an arms race game, of cheap talk when private types are independent.
In an arms race the payo  from building up weapons is decreasing in the number of agents
who adopt the same strategy, while the payo  from not acquiring new weapons is increasing
in the number of agents who do not acquire new weapons.
3A related work is also Mason and Valentinyi (2003). There, the focus is on the interaction
2Given the above work, the common view is that, in order to escape a predic-
tion of indeterminacy of equilibria, one needs to have a su!ciently large degree
of heterogeneity and/or of asymmetric information. However, as we show here,
this may not be true in macroeconomic contexts. In particular, this paper
complements the received literature by focusing on the ‘largeness’ of the situa-
tions in question. In more detail, our starting point is that in macroeconomic
environments the number of potential innovators, speculators, e.t.c. is, by deÞ-
nition, very large. The standard assumption that every player takes every other
player’s behaviour as given and known when contemplating her best response
therefore seems somewhat implausible. For instance, in large societies, it may
be prohibitively expensive to collect the necessary information for who all the
stakeholders are. As Myerson notes, in large games “it is unrealistic to assume
that every player knows all the other players in the game; instead, a more real-
istic model should admit some uncertainty about the number of players in the
game” (Myerson (2000) pp.7). We contribute to the literature on macroeco-
nomics and complementarities by following Myerson’s suggestion and allowing
for population uncertainty in investigating the conditions under which unique
equilibrium selection is obtained. SpeciÞcally, given the convenient properties
associated with the Poisson distribution (see Myerson (1998)), we model the
coordination problem as a Poisson game.
As a complementary justiÞcation for this modelling choice, suppose that
the identity of every stakeholder is indeed common knowledge but also that
binding individual orders for new technology, or for short-sales of a currency,
must arrive with the inventor, or central bank, by a given time. Standard theory
suggests that each agent will decide on her action by taking the number of
orders at the collector’s disposal as given. However, potential stakeholders may
be ill, postmen may be on strike or computer networks may be down; in short,
accidents will happen, albeit with a small, but strictly positive, probability. As
of incomplete information and heterogeneities in a large class of games.
3a result, in a large environment, stakeholders should actually view the number
of players in the coordination game as a Poisson random variable (PRV).
Before embarking on our analysis, we feel that we should emphasise the fol-
lowing. First, Poisson games are not a special case of global games. As Myerson
(1998) discusses both Bayesian games and Poisson games are subsumed by the
general class of population uncertainty games. Second, as it will be made clear
shortly after, our explanation of equilibrium uniqueness is analytically simpler
than the existing explanations. Third, as we will see later on, our model o ers
di erent predictions to the ones in the received literature on complementarities
and uniqueness.
The organisation of the paper is as follows. Next Section describes the model.
Section 3 describes equilibrium. Finally, Section 4 discusses some applications
and the last Section concludes.
2 The Model
Consider the following symmetric coordination game between a very large num-
ber of potential stakeholders. The typical agent has to choose an action c  
{0,1}. The net payo  from taking action c = 1 is given by b( ,x) ! t where
x   R+ is the number of occurrences of action c = 1 in the game, and     R
and t   R++ are parameters. Action c = 0 can be viewed as the decision to
stick with the old technology, or abstain from attacking a peg, and t as the
‘transaction cost’ the agent saves from choosing c = 0. The function b() deter-
mines the beneÞt from switching technologies or speculating. This beneÞt is a
non-decreasing function of economic fundamentals  , and of the number of inno-
vations, or attacks, x. To simplify exposition, assume that lim  !" b( ,1) < t.
That is, a single innovation, or attack, is not proÞtable at the lowest of fun-
damentals. Assume also that the beneÞt function b(), economic fundamentals
  and cost t are common knowledge when the agents are called upon deciding
4their action. Finally, assume that agents resolve any indi erence in favour of
the ‘safe’ strategy c = 0.
Putting more structure into the model, deÞne  H = argmax {  | b( ,1)   t},
after following the convention that if b( ,1)   t for any   then  H ! +". Given
the properties of the beneÞt function we have that b( ,x  +1) > t for any level
of fundamentals   >  H and any number of ‘other’ adoptions x  # 0.
DeÞne,4 now,  L = argmax {  | limx!" b( ,x)   t}, after following the con-
ventions that if limx!" b( ,x)   t for any   then  L ! +", and if limx!" b( ,x)
> t for any   then  L ! $". Given the properties of the beneÞt function we
have that if  L is Þnite then b( ,x +1)   t for any level of fundamentals      L
and any size of ‘other’ orders x  # 0.
Note, from the properties of the beneÞt function, that  H > $" and
 L    H. Thus, if fundamentals are su!ciently high, i.e.   >  H, equilib-
rium is unique: every player chooses the ‘risky’ action c = 1. If fundamentals
are su!ciently low, i.e.   % ($", L], then equilibrium is again unique: every
player chooses the safe action c = 0. If, however, fundamentals are in an inter-
mediate range, i.e.   % ( L, H], then the incentive to choose the risky action
c = 1 depends on the beliefs about the size of other orders x . To see an illustra-
tion of this, consider the benchmark case where the number of actual players in
the game N is common knowledge, and deÞne  
N
L = argmax {  | b( ,N)   t}.
It follows directly that for any level of fundamentals   % ( 
N
L , H] this bench-
mark game has two (pure-strategy) equilibria. One with xo = N,5 and one with
xo = 0.6
In what follows we assume instead, which is how we depart from other studies
4In a currency crises model high   corresponds to ‘bad’ fundamentals, and to high de-
valuation if an attack succeeds. In a new technology adoption model, ‘good’ fundamentals
correspond to high  , and to high quality of invention (or high spillover e ects).
5Superscript o denotes equilibrium variables.
6While, for     (!", N
L ] the benchmark game has a unique equilibrium where every player
chooses c = 0
5of strategic complementarities, that the number of actual players in the coordi-
nation game N is a PRV with mean n. We will refer to n as the population or
game or group-size. Also, we focus hereafter to fundamentals   % ( L, H].
3 Equilibrium
Introducing population uncertainty implies that players can no longer assign a
strategy to other individual players, simply because they are not aware of who
they all are. Instead, we describe strategic behaviour in terms of a distributional
strategy (see Myerson (2000)). Such a strategy, !n, is deÞned as any probability
distribution over the action set in a game of size n. That is !n(1)+!n(0) = 1 and
!n(c) # 0. Note that !n can be interpreted as the ‘beliefs’ players choose to hold
that a randomly sampled player will choose action c in a game of size n.7 As
Myerson (1998) puts it “...going to a model of population uncertainty requires us
specify a probability distribution over actions..., rather than for each individual
player. In e ect, population uncertainty forces us to treat players symmetrically
in our game-theoretic analysis.”
When players behave according to !, the number of players of any type
that choose any action c is a PRV with mean n!(c) and hence the expected
action proÞle in a game of size n is n! ! {n!(c)}c#C. To derive expected
payo s for each action, given n!, we make use of two special features of Poisson
games. First, that the number of players choosing c is independent of the
number of players who choose all other actions (see Myerson (1998)).8 Second,
that any player in a Poisson game attaches the same probability that there
are d individuals in the game with him with the probability that the external
7For notational convenience, we supress hereafter the dependence of the strategy ! on the
size of the game n whenever there is no danger of confusion.
8Without population uncertainty this property could not be satisÞed since the total number
of players who choose a certain action must be equal to the known N, see Myerson (1998)
pp.9.
6game theorist would attach on the event that there are d individuals in the
whole game. This ‘environmental equivalence’ property implies that “from the
perspective of any player..., the number of other players (not including himself)
who choose action c is also an independent Poisson random variable with the
same mean n!(c)”, Myerson (1998), pp 16. Accordingly, the expected net gain
of the typical agent from choosing c = 1 is
B(n!, ,t) ! $t + Eb( ,x  + 1) ! $t +
" X
x =0
f(x  | n!(1))b( ,x  + 1), (1)
with f being the Poisson distribution with mean n!(1), after following the con-
vention that f(0 | 0) = 1.
In essence, then, each player resolves her decision by formulating ‘beliefs’
! over the likely behaviour of the typical player in the game and then calcu-
lating which action maximises her expected utility given the resulting expected
action proÞle. Following Myerson (2000), we establish an equilibrium if “all
the probability of choosing action c comes from types for whom c is an optimal
action, when everyone else is expected to behave according to this distributional
strategy” (Myerson (2000), pp.11).
We then have directly that !o(1) = 0 is an equilibrium, as B(0, ,t) =
b( ,1)$t   0 for any      H. Regardless of the group-size, if the typical agent
expects that no other player in the game plays the risky action, he is certain that
the size of ‘other’ orders is zero, i.e. f(0 | 0) = 1, and thereby Þnds it optimal
to play safe as well. Anticipating, on the other hand, that every other player
in the game chooses the risky action, implies that the representative agent’s
expected beneÞt from playing the risky action as well depends on her beliefs
about the actual game-size f(x  | n) and the extend of complementarities, i.e.
how b( ,x) increases with x. In particular, !o(1) = 1 is an equilibrium if and
only if B(n, ,t) > 0, that is if and only if
" P
x =0
f(x  | n)b( ,x  + 1) > t. We
have shown:
Proposition 1 In a Poisson Contribution Game of expected size n, with level
7of fundamentals   % ( L, H] and costs t, every player in the game playing the
safe action is an equilibrium, i.e. !o(1) = 0. This is the unique (pure-strategy)
equilibrium if and only if B(n, ,t)   0.
The condition B(n; ,t)   0 can be used to investigate the interaction of
game-size n, costs t and level of fundamentals   % ( L, H], and the implica-
tions for uniqueness of equilibrium. In particular, we have in a straightforward
manner that:
Proposition 2 In a Poisson Contribution Game of expected size n, with
level of fundamentals   % ( L, H] and costs t suppose that the net beneÞt from
the risky action B() is increasing with game-size. Then every player in the game
playing the safe action is the unique equilibrium, if group-size is su ciently low,
given t.
Proof. Directly after recalling B(0, ,t) = b( ,1)   t ! 0 and deÞning the
appropriate threshold level n  " 0 by B(n , ,t) = 0. ¥
In the next section we look into some examples that Þt the above framework.
4 Examples
4.1 Currency Crises
We start with a model of currency crises. In this model potential speculators
have a choice between not questioning a currency peg or borrowing one unit
of the currency in question and selling it in the market for foreign currencies.
Here, t is the riskless gross interest rate plus any transaction costs faced by the
speculators.
Also, b( ,x) " 0 determines in a reduced form the size of the depreciation
of the currency under scrutiny, as a proportion of the exchange rate during the
peg, when fundamentals are   and the size of the attack is x. In particular,
for our purposes here, the beneÞt function is deÞned as follows. First, for any
8  >  H we have b( ,1) = !( ) > t with !
0( ) > 0, while for any   !  H we have
b( ,1) = 0. A single attack is not enough to cause the central bank to abandon
the peg if the latter is su ciently robust, i.e. if   !  H. If, however,   >  H
the peg is so fragile that even a single attack would induce the collapse of the
Þxed exchange rate regime. Furthermore, the depreciation is su cient to cover
the costs of attacking the peg. Note that here  H is independent of transaction
costs t. Second, for any   # ( $, L] we have that limx!" b( ,x) = 0, while
for any   >  L we have limx!" b( ,x) = !( ) > t. If   !  L the peg is stable:
no attack will cause its collapse. If instead   >  L an attack of inÞnite size will
be too much for the central bank to contain and the peg will be abandoned.
In addition, the depreciation is su cient to cover the costs of short-selling the
currency. Note that in this model  L is also independent of transaction costs
t.9 Third, for any   # ( L, H] and x # (1,$) we have that b( ,x) is a step
function of the size of the attack x. In particular, b( ,x) = 0 if 1 < x < x ( )
and b( ,x) = !( ) > t if x " x ( ), with x 0( ) < 0. If the attack on the peg is
su ciently high then the central bank abandons the Þxed exchange rate regime
and the currency under scrutiny depreciates by !( ); otherwise the peg survives.




n) =  t + !( )[1   F(x ( )   2 | n)], where F() is the Poisson c.d.f. So,
when fundamentals are in the ‘grey’ area ( L, H], survival of the peg is the
unique equilibrium outcome if the total probability that an attack is successful,
1   F(x ( )   2 | n), is lower than or equal to the ratio of (maximum) beneÞts
from the two actions t/!( ) % r. DeÞning G(y | n) %
" P
x =y
f(x# | n) and
m % x ( ) 1 we thus have a unique equilibrium selection if G(m | n) ! r. Not-
9An alternative model could have that a devaluation always occurs if the attack is very
large, but for very good fundamentals the beneÞt cannot compensate for the transaction cost.
That is, limx ! b( ,x) = !( ) > 0 with !0( ) > 0 and !( )   t for any      L. In such a
model,  L may depend on the level of transaction costs, and thereby be sensitive to policies
like a Tobin tax.
9ing that G(m | n) is strictly increasing with the mean n (see theorem 33.2 in pp.
92 in Schmetterer, 1974), the latter condition can be re-written as n ! n (r,m),
where n (r,m) is the solution of r = G(m,n). Note also that n (.,.) is strictly
increasing with short-selling costs t, as the latter increase the ratio of beneÞts
r and make the risky action less attractive. The critical group-size n (.,.) is
also strictly decreasing with  , as the latter decreases the ratio of beneÞts r
(due to !
0 > 0) and increases the fragility of the peg (due to x 0 < 0), and
thereby makes the risky action more attractive. We clearly have that for any
  # ( L, H] :
Corollary 1: In the currency crises model if the mean number of actual
speculators is su ciently low and/or transaction costs are su ciently high, equi-
librium is unique, no attack occurs and the peg survives.
Leaving this example note that here an increase in transaction costs from
short-selling, by means, say, of the introduction of a Tobin tax, increases the
ratio of beneÞts from not attacking and, hence, the critical group-size n (.,.),
and thereby increases the likelihood that no attack will occur.10 Imposition
of direct capital controls increases the robustness of the peg by increasing the
minimum size of the attack necessary for the collapse of the regime, x ( ),
for any level of fundamentals. Thus, this policy measure as well increases the
critical game-size n (.,.) and the likelihood that the peg will survive.
The present model of currency crises is very similar to the one in Morris
and Shin (1998), where small di!erences in information determine the outcome
of an incomplete information game. Yet, the main predictions about the kind
of crises that can erupt are qualitatively di!erent. In particular, the model in
Morris and Shin (1998) features ‘probing’ attacks prior to the collapse of the
peg, unless there is a sudden shift of su cient size in fundamentals. In the latter
10Continuing from footnote 7, if  L is the lowest level of fundamentls for which an attack
is not strictly proÞtable, i.e. b( L) = t, then the imposition of a Tobin tax would also result
in an increase in  L and, so, in a reduction of the ‘grey area’of fundamentals.
10case, we have ‘business as usual’ prior to the launch of a successful attack on
the peg. Here, instead, even if shifts in fundamentals are very small, the peg is
not tested by the market until its collapse. This collapse, as in Morris and Shin
(1998), takes place as soon as fundamentals cross a well-deÞned threshold (i.e.
  >  H).
4.2 Innovation and Positive Spillovers
We turn to a model of adoption of new technology with positive spillovers. In this
model potential innovators have a choice between switching to a new technology
or not. Here, t is the cost of innovating, of switching from the old to the new
technology. Also, the beneÞt from innovating b( ,x) is continuous and strictly
increasing with the extend of innovation x and the quality of the new technology
 . In particular, for the purposes here, we assume that b( ,x) = !( )x with
0 < !( ) < t and !0( ) > 0. That is, for individual sunk costs to be recouped
enough innovations must take place. I addition, quality and the extend of
innovation are complements. Note that in this model  H = +  and  L = ! .
In this case, B(n; ,t) = !t+!( )
P 
x =0 f(x! | n)(x!+1) = !t+!( )[n+
1]. So, for any level of quality, survival of the old technology is the unique
equilibrium outcome if the mean population-size n is lower than or equal to [t!
!( )]/!( ).11 The critical upper bound on the game-size for unique equilibrium
selection is again strictly increasing with costs t and strictly decreasing with
fundamentals  , and so we we have that for any   " R :
Corollary 2: In the innovation game if the mean number of actual innova-
tors is su ciently low and/or switching costs are su ciently high and/or quality
is su ciently ‘bad’ (i.e.   su ciently low), equilibrium is unique, no innovation
occurs and the old technology survives.
Leaving this example, we note that subsidies, which reduce the cost of in-
11An alternative model of innovation with spillovers could be with b( ,x) = !( )+ "x with
" > 0, !( )+" < t and !0 > 0. In this case, the condition for uniqueness is n   [t!!( )!"]/".
11novating, make switching more likely as they reduce the critical game size n".
The present model of innovations is very similar to the one in Lee and Ma-
son (2002), where agents’ preferences di er, and agents may also be faced with
uncertainty about the fundamentals. Yet, the main characteristics of the equi-
librium outcome, whenever uniqueness is ensured, are qualitatively di erent. In
particular, the model in Lee and Mason (2002) features an intermediate area
of fundamentals (or, under fundamental uncertainty, of common signals about
the uncertain fundamentals) where the proportion of adoptions is greater than
zero, less than one and increasing with the quality of fundamentals (or signals).
Also, to the left of that area (i.e. for su!ciently ‘bad’ fundamentals) innova-
tions do not take place, while to the right of that area (i.e. for su!ciently ‘good’
fundamentals) everyone innovates. Thus, the prediction is that, unless there is
a sudden increase of a su!cient size in the quality of fundamentals, improve-
ments in quality will be accompanied by small increases, if any, in the number
of adoptions. Here, instead, adoptions are never partial. SpeciÞcally, our model
predicts a sudden and abrupt adoption of new technologies by every agent as
soon as fundamentals cross a well-deÞned threshold (i.e.   >  H).
5 Conclusions
We investigated a coordination game under population uncertainty, and in par-
ticular when the number of players in the game is a Poisson random variable.
This game may or may not be characterised by multiplicity of pure strategy
equilibria. In fact, beliefs are not independent of fundamentals, a coordination
problem does not arise, and unique equilibrium selection is obtained under cer-
tain conditions for fundamentals, mean population and transaction cost from
innovating, short-selling e.t.c.
A very interesting line of research is to investigate the interaction of popula-
tion uncertainty with heterogeneity, uncertainty about economic fundamentals
12and/or asymmetric information. Such research will expand our knowledge of
complementarities in macroeconomics, enrich policy debates and provide em-
pirical explorations with a wider range of theoretical modelling to draw upon.
6 References
1. Burdzy, K., D. Frankel, and A. Pauzner, 2001, “Fast Equilibrium Selection
by Rational Players Living in a Changing World”, Econometrica 69, 163-
189.
2. Baliga, S., and T. Sjostrom, 2004, “Arms Races and Negotiations”, Review
of Economic Studies 71, 351-69.
3. Carlsson, H., and E. van Damme, 1993, “Global Games and Equilibrium
Selection”, Econometrica 61, 989-1018.
4. Cooper, R., 1999, Coordination Games: Complementarities and Macroe-
conomics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
5. Frankel, D., and A. Pauzner, 2000, “Resolving Indeterminacy in Dynamic
Settings: The Role of Shocks”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 115, 285-
304.
6. Herrendorf, B., A. Valentinyi, and R. Waldman, 2000, “Ruling out Mul-
tiplicity and Indeterminacy”, Review of Economic Studies 67, 295-308.
7. Lee, I.H., and R. Mason, 2002, “Coordination in the Static and the Dy-
namic”, mimeo.
8. Mason, R., and A. Valentinyi, “Independence and Heterogeneity in Games
of Incomplete Information”, mimeo.
9. Morris, S., and H.S. Shin, 2000, “Rethinking Multiple Equilibria in Macroe-
conomic Modelling”, NBER Macroeconomics Annual.
1310. Morris, S., and H.S. Shin, 2001, “Global Games: Theory and Applica-
tions”, mimeo.
11. Myerson, R., 1998, “Population Uncertainty and Poisson Games”, Inter-
national Journal of Game Theory 27, 375-392.
12. Myerson, R., 2000, “Large Poisson Games”, Journal of Economic Theory
94, 7-45.
13. Schelling, T.C., 1980, The Strategy of Conßict, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge.
14. Schmetterer, L, 1974, Introduction to Mathematical Statistics, Springer-
Verlag, Berlin.
14